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It is a sequential game involving two players, the trustor and the trustee. In a one-shot anonymous interaction, subject A (“the Investor” or "the Trustor") endowed with an amount of 10-dollar decides how much of this show-up fee will be given to subject B (“the Trustee”), knowing that this share will be tripled before it’s actually given to subject B. Subject B receives this tripled amount and decides how much to send back to subject A (From Tzieropoulos, 2013, doi: 10.1080/17470919.2013.832375). It can be played in one-shot or in multi-round format.

Initially called the Investment Game by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe in 1995 (doi: 10.1006/game.1995.1027), the trust game originated as a design experiment to study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting (From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictator_game#Variants). In the Berg et al. version, subjects in room A decide how much of their 10 dollar show-up fee to send to an anonymous counterpart in room B. Subjects in room B then decide how much of the tripled money to keep and how much to send back to their respective counterparts. This game is similar to the trust game described by Kreps (1990, https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/publications/corporate-culture-economic-theory), except that the Kreps game allow only two choices at each stage, whereas the Berg version (and the current version of trust game) has a larger choice space and allows for different degrees of trust and reciprocity) (Berg et al., 1995).

Definition contributed by IAlmeida
Trust game (TG) has been asserted to measure the following CONCEPTS
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Phenotypes associated with Trust game (TG)

Disorders

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Traits

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Behaviors

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IMPLEMENTATIONS of Trust game (TG)
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EXTERNAL DATASETS for Trust game (TG)
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CONDITIONS

Experimental conditions are the subsets of an experiment that define the relevant experimental manipulation.

CONTRASTS

You must specify conditions before you can define contrasts.


In the Cognitive Atlas, we define a contrast as any function over experimental conditions. The simplest contrast is the indicator value for a specific condition; more complex contrasts include linear or nonlinear functions of the indicator across different experimental conditions.

INDICATORS

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An indicator is a specific quantitative or qualitative variable that is recorded for analysis. These may include behavioral variables (such as response time, accuracy, or other measures of performance) or physiological variables (including genetics, psychophysiology, or brain imaging data).

Term BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Trust Game in neuroscience: A short review
Hélène Tzieropoulos
Social Neuroscience
2013-09-02

Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe
Games and Economic Behavior
1995-07-01